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Abstract. Despite a legal framework being in place for several years, the 
market share of qualified electronic signatures is disappointingly low. 
Mobile Signatures provide a new and promising opportunity for the de-
ployment of an infrastructure for qualified electronic signatures.  We 
analyzed two possible signing approaches (server based and client 
based signatures) and conclude that SIM-based signatures are the most 
secure and convenient solution. However, using the SIM-card as a se-
cure signature creation device (SSCD) raises new challenges, because it 
would contain the user’s private key as well as the subscriber identifi-
cation. Combining both functions in one card raises the question who 
will have the control over the keys and certificates. We propose a pro-
tocol called Certification on Demand (COD) that separates certification 
services from subscriber identification information and allows consum-
ers to choose their appropriate certification services and service provid-
ers based on their needs. We also present some of the constraints that 
still have to be addressed before qualified mobile signatures are possi-
ble. 
1   Introduction 
In the directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[ECDir1999] legal requirements for a common introduction of electronic signatures 
in Europe were enacted. The directive sets a framework of requirements for security 
of technology used for electronic signatures. Based on certificates issued by certifica-
tion authorities, which certify public keys for a person registered by a registration 
authority, electronic signatures can be created with a so-called “secure signature crea-
tion device” (SSCD), carrying the private keys of a person. 
The EC-directive distinguishes between “electronic signatures” and “advanced elec-
tronic signatures” [ECDir1999]. An advanced electronic signature is defined as an 
electronic signature that meets the following requirements:  
“(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; 
 
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory; 
 
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain 
under his sole control; and 
 
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a 
manner that any subsequent change of the data is 
detectable;” [ECDir1999] 
 
Certification Service Providers can issue certificates for advanced signatures that will 
be qualified if they meet the requirements of Annex I of the directive. Those ad-
vanced signatures with qualified certificates will be refered to in this paper as quali-
fied signatures. 
In Germany and Austria, the local implementation of the EC directive requires 
evaluation of the SSCD to be done against ITSEC E4 or CC EAL 4+ levels 
[FuFr2000]. For directory services, stringent 24/7 availability and durability is re-
quired. Revocation lists and other feasible technology must be available to all accept-
ing parties of signed documents. The EU suggests the implementation of a public 
evaluation infrastructure under control of a government authority. Germany has al-
ready implemented a system of evaluation service companies, evaluation consulting 
companies and the Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications [RegTP2004] as 
the responsible government authority. 
 
The deployment of signature card products focused so far on smart cards with evalua-
tion against the requirements for lawful electronic signatures. Based on these, per-
sonal computer based signature applications have entered the market. These applica-
tions require smart card readers attached to the workstation, thereby preventing user 
mobility. 
The market share of EC-directive conforming smart cards is disappointingly low, 
failing to meet any involved party’s expectations. This has partly been blamed on the 
incompatibility and missing standards of existing products. Also the lack of custom-
ers prevents companies from investing in signature products. As a result almost no 
commercial usage for qualified electronic signatures exists. Consequently no custom-
ers seek to obtain signature products. 
There are numerous activities trying to enlarge the potential consumer base like put-
ting key pairs on national identity cards [FSEID2004]. Lately there have been some 
efforts towards mobile signatures [ETSI] [Raddic2004] and this approach might have 
a chance to break up the deadlock of missing customers and missing applications. 
However, there are numerous problems to be solved, before qualified signatures can 
be created with a mobile device. 
The first part of this paper (Section 2) gives an overview on the possible approaches 
for mobile signatures especially focused on SIM1-based signatures and it’s challenges 
                                                           
1 Subscriber Identity Module in detail (section 3). In section 4 we present a protocol for SIM-card deployment 
solving most of these challenges. Section 5 provides an outlook on possible usage 
scenarios of that protocol and section 6 focuses on the security of mobile devices. In 
section 7 we examine special constraints of mobile signatures and section 8 concludes 
our findings. 
2   Mobile Signatures 
Mobile signatures are electronic signatures which are created using a mobile device 
and rely on signature or certification services in a location independent telecommuni-
cation environment. They allow signatory mobility beyond fixed, secure desktop 
workstation with trusted, personal signing equipment [FrRaRo2003]. Although using 
mobile devices for signature creation has several shortcomings (e.g. display size, 
communication costs, limited computing power), the high market penetration of cell 
phones [GSM2004] and the mobility gained make this effort potentially successful 
and promising. 
Two possible signing approaches in the mobile environment have been proposed in 
the past: signatures created in centralized signing server environments located at 
service providers like mobile network carriers; and electronic signatures created in-
side the signer’s mobile device using a smart card.  
2.1   Server Based Electronic Signatures  
Server based electronic signatures are signatures created by a service provider for a 
specific customer. Figure 1 illustrates such a server infrastructure.    
Fig. 1: Sever based electronic signature infrastructure 
With server based signatures it is important to distinguish between signatures that 
have a corresponding certificate issued under the name of the customer and signatures 
with certificates issued under the name of the service provider or an employee of this 
provider. 
In the first case it is necessary that the customer transfers his private key to the ser-
vice provider. However, according to Art.2, 2(c) the signature has to be created by 
means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control to achieve the status of 
an advanced signature [ECDir1999]. By giving away his private key this premise can 
not be fulfilled [FrRaRo2003]. In the case of signatures whose certificates are issued 
under the name of the service provider you can not assume these signatures to be 
legal signatures of the customer. They are signatures of the signature service provider 
and only enable an identification of the provider. Those signatures can achieve the 
status of advanced signatures with qualified certificates as long as they fulfill the 
requirements of Annex I and are provided by certification service provider who ful-
fills the requirements of Annex II. Therefore, the signature service provider acts as a 
replacement for the customer. However, based on the signature of the provider it can 
not be verified that the customer really authorized the signature. Neither the integrity 
nor the fact that the user authorized it can be proven. There are possible technical 
solutions to accomplish the integrity and accountability of his authorization but they 
would require a security environment on mobile devices that would enable the device 
to create qualified signatures itself [RaFrRo2003]. 2.2   Client Based Electronic Signatures 
Signatures can be created inside the mobile device using a secure signature creation 
device which has to fulfill the requirements of Annex III. Using a multiple smart card 
solution, the signature smart card, certified by a certification provider, is inserted into 
the mobile device which already contains the usual SIM-card. Therefore, the signa-
ture process takes place on the mobile device and the user is able to use basically any 
signature card available on the market. This can be achieved by either exchanging the 
SIM-card with the signature card (Dual Chip) or by having an additional chip card 
reader within the mobile device (Dual Slot). The first solution is very inconvenient 
for the signatory since he has to switch of the phone to exchange the cards for the 
signature creation and again to use the phone functionality. In the latter case a spe-
cialized mobile phone is required that has multiple smart card slots which almost 
none of the current mobile phones do. 
It would also be possible to use a single smart card that contains the SIM telephone 
functions, as well as the secure signature creation device. This can be achieved either 
by leaving some free space on the SIM-card, on which the components of the signa-
ture creation device can be installed later on, or by shipping SIM-cards with prein-
stalled signature functionality that has to be initialized and activated.  
We propose the usage of evaluated smart cards suitable for qualified electronic signa-
tures which are extended by the SIM functionality and usable through a unified inter-
face, e.g. with the USIM2 specification TS 21.111 [3GPPSpec]. Another approach 
might be the migration and evaluation of USIM with a full WAP3/WIM4 implementa-
tion for the purpose of lawful mobile signing [WAPF2004]. Evaluation must be car-
ried out with ITSEC or Common Criteria within an evaluation process similar to the 
evaluation summarized in [FuFr2000]. 
 
3   Challenges of SIM Based Signatures 
Using a single smart card for both functionalities provides the most convenient solu-
tion for the signatory. He can sign documents and distribute them via communication 
services of his cell phone like GPRS5 or UMTS6. To ensure that the requirements of 
Art.2 2(c) are met, it is necessary to provide some sort of reliable access control to the 
signature functions. The usual PIN used to control the access to the telephone func-
tions is not sufficient, since users can keep their phones and SIMs unlocked for con-
venience. Like traditional signature cards, SIM-cards can be certified according to 
security evaluation criteria and are under control of the user. 
However, using a single smart card for multiple purposes raises new questions and 
challenges. The SIM-card is issued by the telecommunication provider, while the 
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6 Universal Mobile Telecommunication System SSCD is issued by a certification service provider. Combining both functions in one 
card raises the question who will have the control over the keys and certificates. 
The simple solution is that the deploying carrier also initializes the signature secrets 
to act as a trust provider for their customers. This seems to be reasonable at first 
glance, since some of the european carriers already own and maintain trust centers 
(i.e. Deutsche Telekom), but there are several shortcomings, which make this ap-
proach unpractical. 
First of all the customer wants to leave the store with his SIM-card right away, so he 
can use his mobile phone instead of waiting several weeks for the certification proc-
ess to be completed. Furthermore, binding the keys to a carrier creates a great hin-
drance for the customer to switch to a cheaper carrier in the future. From the carriers 
point of view this would of course be a positive effect. From the customer’s perspec-
tive, however, it would be much better to be able to choose freely between different 
certification service providers. 
Also due to the lack of success of the signature market so far most providers probably 
do not want to invest in building and maintaining their own trust center to provide 
certification services. In addition, they don’t want to change their distribution chan-
nels unless they expect an increase in revenue. 
Therefore, a different solution for mobile signing and certification is needed, that 
allows separation of subscriber information and certification services. 
4   Certification on Demand 
The mobile operator could sell SIM-cards equipped with a key generator for one or 
more key pair(s) which can be used for the signing functionality. After obtaining the 
SIM-card from the mobile operator, the customer can then generate the keys and 
activate the signature component and the public key(s) can be certified by any Certi-
fication Service Provider on demand. 
Through the separation of the telephone functionality and the (possibly later) certifi-
cation of the user’s identity by a certification service provider, both functions can be 
sold separately and can be obtained from different providers. 
The carrier will probably face increased costs for the signature capable SIM-card but 
can also expect increasing traffic caused by signature services. All distribution chan-
nels will remain unchanged. 
Figure 2 illustrates the necessary steps for the distribution of the SIM-card and the 
certification process. CardManufacturer Carrier Customer Registration Authority Certification Authority
8:
7:
9:
6:
5:
4:
3:
1:
2:
 
Fig. 2:  Certification on Demand Protocol 
1.  The carrier gives his IMSI7/Ki8 pairs to a card manufacturer. 
2.  The card manufacturer returns a SIM card containing an IMSI/Ki pair, a key 
generator for the signature application and the public key of the RootCA to the 
carrier. 
3.  The SIM card is sold to the customer and the carrier provides a nullpin that is 
used to generate the keys and activate the signing functionality. 
4.  The customer generates the keys and activates the signing functionality by en-
tering the nullpin.  
5.  The customer registers at a Registration Authority of his choice, providing 
identification information and his public key. 
6.  The customer sends his identification information signed with his private key 
over the air to the Certification Authority.  
7.  The Registration Authority sends the public key and the identification infor-
mation to the Certification Authority. 
                                                           
7 International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
8 Individual subscriber authentication key 8.  If the information provided by the customer and the Registration Authority 
match, the Certification Authority issues a certificate for the customer and 
sends it over the air to his mobile phone. 
9.  The user can verify the validity of his certificate by checking the certificate is-
sued by the RootCA of the Certification Service Provider. 
 
This protocol makes no changes to the existing distribution infrastructure of mobile 
operators. The steps 1 to 3 remain the same way they used to be before, apart from 
the fact that the card manufactures puts additional information and functionality (sig-
nature key generator, public key of RootCA) on the SIM card. In order to ensure that 
the card manufacturer does not know the private key of the user the key generation 
should be done by the card. The customer is not forced to certify his keys and can use 
the SIM for telephone functionality only. He could also activate the signing function-
ality without going through the certification process for example as a security token. 
If he wants to be able to make legal binding electronic signatures, he has to go 
through the complete process to obtain a qualified certificate. He can do this by freely 
choosing the CSP.  
The nullpin to generate the keys and activate the signing functionality in step 4 is 
used to ensure that no signatures can be created before the customer has control over 
the SIM card. If the signature application has been activated before, the user will 
recognize this when entering the nullpin.  
Step 6 could be omitted but serves as insurance for the customer to ensure him that   
the integrity of his identification information will be preserved. 
If the customer wants to change his CSP, he only has to repeat steps 5 to 9 with his 
new CSP. If the customer wants to change his carrier, he has to go through the whole 
protocol again, but can register with his current Certification Service Provider.  
5   Possible Applications 
5.1 Enabling Security Infrastructures 
There is a need of corporations to provide their mobile workforce with secure access 
to the corporate backend. So far security tokens have been used to allow this func-
tionality. These tokens are expensive and stored on extra hardware that needs to be 
carried around and can easily be lost. Putting these credentials on a SIM, that will be 
placed in the mobile phone, reduces the risk of losing the credential as well as the 
costs. But some corporations greatly object to leave their private keys and certificates 
in the hands of their mobile operator. 
With Certification on Demand the corporation’s IT security department can obtain 
COD enabled SIMs from the corporation’s cellular contractor and initializes them for 
the corporate mobile security infrastructure. The WiTness project [WiTness] spon-
sored by the European Union implements such an infrastructure. 
  
Fig. 3: WiTness Pervasive Salesman Scenario [WiTness] 
Figure 3 shows an application scenario where a “pervasive salesman” has secure, 
corporate-controlled access to all data available to him in the corporate information 
system. Access is controlled by a security module based on a SIM with additional 
security functionality. 
5.2 Multilateral secure financial transactions 
Storing bank credentials on a SIM may help the migration from plastic to mobile 
phones. A COD infrastructure allows financial institutions to certify and enable mo-
bile subscribers to use banking services online through their mobile terminal and 
SIM. Credentials could be certified by the bank itself, like the credentials used on 
bank cards. Therefore, the bank can still have the control over the credentials while 
the mobile operator still can issue the SIM cards without giving their IMSI/Ki pairs 
away to the bank. This would enable the bank to offer services like transactions, bro-
kerage or checking the account balance based on the credentials stored in the SIM. 
This functionality can and has been realized without the Certification on Demand 
protocol but only if the banks and carriers are willing to cooperate. In the Czech Re-
public T-Mobile [TMO2004] and the Czech banks agreed to send their critical infor-
mation to Giesecke&Devrient, a card manufacturer who started producing banking 
enabled SIMs [GuD2004]. However, the COD protocol would enable banks to use 
SIMs as credentials without having a contract with the mobile operator. 5.3 Enabling mobile electronic consent and identity management 
Many mobility applications rely on a user’s consent towards reducing his privacy for 
a particular service. Examples are location based services on cellular networks, situa-
tion based marketing scenarios and tracking technology following users to support 
them with information they need in-time and in-place. A secure provable electronic 
consent of users can be achieved using electronic signatures on SIM-created creden-
tials that may contain information about time, intent and recipient of the electronic 
consent. Research has found SIMs to be on the edge of a global identity management 
infrastructure [Rann2003]. In the near future, personal or role attributes customized 
for particular application areas (e.g. online dating, identity management) could be 
managed on SIMs on demand from their owners. 
5.4 Using COD in deployment of electronic identity cards 
If the signature credentials are stored on an identity card issued by the government, 
the same problems as described in section 3 occur. The Government has to issue the 
identity card but does not want to act as a certification service provider. Using the 
COD or a similar protocol enables current CSPs to certify the keys of the recipients 
of the identity cards.  
6  Trusted Mobile Devices 
The mobile device serves as the card reader, storage device for the document to be 
signed and as a display for the signature application. Therefore, it must be ensured 
that the data shown on the display is identical with the data signed by the signature 
card. This is commonly known as “What You See Is What You Sign” (WYSIWYS). 
The operating system used on the mobile device has thus a pivotal importance to 
ensure the integrity and accountability of the electronic signature.  
If the authorization mechanisms, memory protection, process generation and separa-
tion or protection of files in an operating system are flawed, an attacker may gain 
access to the different internal processes. He might take advantage of this situation to 
generate forged signatures.  
Fig. 4:  Manipulated digital signature [Federr2003] 
Figure 4 illustrates that application 2 as a malicious program can for example inter-
cept the PIN. An even considerably higher risk exists, however, if the malicious ap-
plication changes the data to be signed after they are displayed to the user. Due to the 
virtual unrestricted hardware access, a malicious program is able to manipulate all 
data transmitted to the signature application before the actual signature takes place. 
In the past mobile phones were “closed” devices that gave the user no possibility of 
installing programs or storing data apart from address book entries. But with increas-
ing computing power and storage capabilities, new and open operating systems like 
PocketPC [Pocket2004] and Symbian [Symbian2004] were developed, which allow 
users to install any program they like. This of course raises the possibility that mal-
ware or Trojan horses are installed by the user or a third person. 
Although a tamper resistant mobile phone could be build and certified most of the 
features of present phones would probably not be available for this phone. Therefore, 
it will probably fail to get a high market penetration. The only solution that seems to 
be promising is to have a small microkernel as a secure platform which runs the sig-
nature application and an additional common operating system running on top of the 
security kernel. 
The “Open Source” project at Saarland University Perseus develops such a system 
[Perseu2004]. It provides a small microkernel as a secure platform. The microkernel 
is responsible for the administration of the device, files, memory and processes and is 
loaded directly after booting. It is aimed at protecting security-critical applications by 
isolating the individual processes from each other. Perseus is based on the approach 
that a normal operating system runs like an application, and therefore the Perseus 
kernel lies below the operating system in the layer architecture. Only by being em-
bedded below the operating system, which is still needed for ordinary applications, 
Perseus can permit isolated processes to take place system-wide between the applica-
tions. Isolated processes are not possible for applications within the standard operat-
ing system, however, but only between the individual “secure applications” and the 
Perseus operating system.  
 
Fig. 5:  System Architecture Perseus [Perseu2004] 
In the Perseus prototype, the trustworthy user interface reserves a line in the upper 
section of the screen that is permanently under the control of the security kernel.  
As the line or LED is under the sole control of Perseus, it cannot be misused by a 
compromised operating system. If the display indicates that the user is communicat-
ing with the Perseus kernel, the control of the full display and keyboard solely lies 
with the security kernel.  
7  Mobility and Signing 
Mobile signatures are made with mobile devices and therefore constraints have to be 
addressed that are not present in traditional signing infrastructures. 
7.1 Data Transfer 
First of all any traffic that is necessary will be accounted to the customer’s bill. 
Therefore, it is essential to create as little data traffic as possible in order to get the 
customer to accept the additional costs. In the case of the signature creation, traffic is 
only necessary for the download of the document to be signed, if at all. In the process 
of signature verification, several documents, especially the keys of all CA’s involved 
have to be downloaded in order to ensure the integrity of the verification process. Revocation lists are a particular concern that has to be met. In order to be up to date 
with actual revocation lists the customer has to be “online” to be able to get access to 
the actual status of all the involved signatures and certificates. This could lead to lots 
of data being transferred and a lot of additional costs. Standards like ISIS-MailTrusT 
[ISISMTT] can be useful as well as concepts of server centric support in document 
verification [Fritsch2002].  
It would also be possible for the CSP to sponsor the additional data traffic in order to 
get customers to accept and use mobile signatures [FSMR 2003].  
7.2 Storage 
Mobile devices usually have a rather fixed amount of storage space. This is even 
more relevant, if one has to store the data on the SIM-card itself, for whatever reason 
possible. Therefore, the mobile signature application should whenever possible try to 
store the necessary information on a server of the service provider. This of course is 
in contrast to the goal of minimizing the necessary traffic for signature applications. 
Therefore, a trade off between cached information and information to be transferred 
has to be found. This is particularly important for the storage of root certificates, 
certification chains and certificate revocation lists for offline-verification. This prob-
lem might be solved by increasing storage space on mobile devices and the ability of 
modern devices to use external storage like SDCards. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Mobile Signatures are a promising approach to break the deadlock between missing 
customers and missing applications. The high market penetration of mobile phones 
enables certificication service providers to target millions of potential customers. We 
analyzed two possible signing approaches (server based and client based signatures) 
and conclude that SIM-based signatures are the most secure and convenient solution. 
However, using the SIM as an SSCD seems to force the mobile operator to act as a 
trust provider and therefore to challenge the existing CSPs in a market that hasn’t 
been successful so far. We proposed a protocol called Certification on Demand that 
seperates subscriber information from certification services and therefore enables 
both industries to cooperate instead of compete with each other. 
We also provided possible application scenarios that can be realized with Certifica-
tion on Demand. But even with the certification problem solved, there are still a lot of 
open issues that have to be addressed before mobile qualified electronic signatures 
will be able to get market acceptance. References 
[3GPPSpec] Specification of GSM, http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/ 
[ECDir1999] European Union: DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a Community frame-
work for electronic signatures 
[ETSI] ETSI MCOMM Specialist Task Force 221 
[Federr2003] H. Fedderath: Digitale Signatur und Public Key Infrastruktur,  
http://www-sec.uni-regensburg.de/security/5PKI.pdf 
[FSEID2004] Project "Feasibility Study Electronic Identity Card", 
     http:// www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/oeff_recht/english/projekte/projekteDigiPerso_eng.ghk 
[Fritsch2002] L. Fritsch.: A secure, economic infrastructure for signing of web based docu-
ments and financial affairs; CBL – Cyberbanking & Law, issue 2/2002; 
[FrRaRo2003] L. Fritsch, J. Ranke, and H. Rossnagel: Qualified Mobile Electronic Signatures: 
Possible, but worth a try? In: Information Security Solutions Europe (ISSE) 2003 Confer-
ence, Vienna Austria  
[FSMR2003] S. Figge, G. Schrott, J. Muntermann, and K. Rannenberg: EARNING M-ONEY – 
A Situation based Approach for Mobile Business Models; In: Proceedings of the 11th Euro-
pean Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) 2003 
[FuFr2000] T. Fuchß, L. Fritsch: Security Certificates as a tool for reliably software engineer-
ing; Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 9/2000, pp.514ff.  
[GuD2004] Giesecke & Devrient: STARSIM® Applications, STARSIM®banking;  
 www.gdm.de/eng/products/04/index.php4 ?product_id=386 
[GSM2004] GSM Association: GSM Statistics 
www.gsmworld.com/news/statistics/index.shtml 
[Perseu2004] B.Pfitzmann, C. Stüble: PERSEUS: A Quick Open-Source Path to Secure Elec-
tronic Signatures, http://www.perseus-os.org/ 
[Pocket2004] Windows Mobile – based Pocket PCs, 
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsmobile/products/pocketpc/default.mspx 
[Raddic2004] Radicchio, http://www.radicchio.org 
[RaFrRo2003] J. Ranke, L. Fritsch, H. Rossnagel: M-Signaturen aus rechtlicher Sicht. 
In: Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 27 (2003) 2, p.95-100, Vieweg & Sohn 
[Rann2003] K. Rannenberg: Identity Management in Mobile Applications  
In: Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 27 (2003) 9 (DuD), pp.546-550, Vieweg & Sohn 
[RegTP2004] Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP) der Bundesre-
publik  Deutschland; http://www.regtp.de/ 
[Symbian2004] Symbian OS – the mobile operating system, http://www.symbian.com 
[TMO2004] T-Mobile: Czech Republic: m-payment becomes a universal payment tool for 
customers; www.t-mobile.net/ CDA/news_details,20,0,newsid-
1799,en.html?w=925&h=588 
[WAPF2004] WAP Forum: Specifications of WAP, WIM; http://www.wapforum.org/ 
[WiTness] European IST Project „Wireless Trust for Europe“(WiTness), 
             www.wireless-trust.org 
 